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WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGMENT NECESSARY TO WAIVE THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
In Connecticut a statute provides that "In actions against the
representatives of deceased persons, no acknowledgment or
promise shall be sufficient evidence of a new or continuing con-
tract to take the case out of the statute of limitations, unless the
same be contained in some writing made or signed by the party
to be charged thereby."' There are similar statutes in other
jurisdictions.2  Under such a statute the question may aris
whether the bar of the statute of limitations is waived where the
debtor before his death gives the creditor promissory notes of
less amount than the face value of the debt, or assigns in writing
policies of life insurance as security for the debt, if neither the
notes nor the assignments make reference to the debt and their
connection with it can be shown only by oral testimony.
'Section 707, General Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of 19o2. The
above provision "shall not alter the effect of any payment of principal
or interest." Ibid.
2For similar statutes see 2 Wigmore on Evidence, § 1466, note 4.
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In Wagner v. Mutual Life Insurance Company3 this question
was answered in the affirmative. The facts in this case bearing
upon the question raised are not set forth at length and the
statute above quoted4 is cited but not quoted in the opinion. An
examination of the record shows, however, the exact nature of
the writings which were held to have satisfied the statute. It
seems that a lawyer had borrowed some $iI,ooo of his wife.
Later he made assignments to her of policies of insurance upon
his life by filling out the blank form contained in the policies,
so that they stated the assignments to have been made "for one
dollar and other valuable considerations." He also gave her his
demand notes, "for value received," amounting to the sum of
$3,ooo. No reference to the loan is made in the assignments
or in the notes, but there is oral testimony of the wife to show
that the assignments were intended as security for the loan and
that the notes were in acknowledgment of it. After the death of
the debtor recovery upon debt is barred by the statute of limita-
tions unless the assignments and the delivery of the notes operate
as a waiver. The question arises in an action in the nature of an
action of interpleader where the widow and the administrator of
the husband are the claimants of the proceeds of one of the
insurance policies. Although the nature of the assets owned by
the estate makes it not yet ascertainable, it is highly probable that
the estate is insolvent and was insolvent at the time of the assign-
ment of the policy. The court holds that both the giving of the
notes and the giving of the assignments are "unequivocal
acknowledgments of the entire debt from which the law would
imply a promise to pay them" (it?).'
The statement of the court that the giving of notes for $3,ooo
was an unequivocal acknowledgment of a debt of $ii,ooo would
seem not wholly accurate in the broad form stated. The mere
fact that a debtor gives his note for $io does not acknowledge
that he owes $io,ooo. It is only when other evidence, possibly
contained in the note itself, shows that the note was given, not
as payment of the debt nor for a multitude of other purposes,
but as a waiver of the statute of limitations, that the statutory bar
is removed. If such other evidence is not contained in the note
itself, the note alone is not sufficient to constitute the acknowledg-
gi Atl. (Conn.) ioi2.
Section 7o7, supra, note I.
' P. IoI5 of 9I Atlantic. "Them" is evidently a misprint for "it."
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ment. That consists of the note and the other evidence. The
same reasoning applies to the assignments which are shown by
parol to have been made as security for the debt. The assign-
ments and the oral evidence, not the assignments alone, form the
acknowledgment. The cases cited by the court hold no more
than this,6 and this would seem to be the correct theory.7 Indeed,
it is recognized by the court when the opinion states that "the
consideration for the assignment was open to oral proof."
Except for the statute quoted above, such acknowledgment would
seem sufficient to waive the statute of limitations."
The statute requiring a written acknowledgment was
undoubtedly passed with the object of preventing a creditor,
whose claim was outlawed, from establishing such claim by word
of mouth. There is another statute in Connecticut making
admissible the declarations and memoranda of a decedent in an
action against his personal representatives; 9 and but for some
'Merrills v. Swift, 18 Conn. 257, 269; Smith v. Ryan, 66 N. Y. 352,
354; Insurance Co. v. Dunscombe, io8 Tenn. 724, 729; Pollock v. Smith,
iO7 Ky. 509; Conway v. Caswell, 121 Ga. 254; Balch v. Onion, 4 Cush.
559; Begue v. St. Marc, 47 La. Ann. 1151; 25 Cyc. 1343. In the cases
cited by the court there was either no statutory requirement that the
acknowledgment should be in writing, or the writing itself referred to
the debt.
"In addition to the cases cited in note 6, compare Wenman v. The
Mohawk Insurance Co., 13 Wend. 267, and Miller v. Magee, 2 N. Y.
Supp. I56. In House v. Peacock, 84 Conn. 54, where an administrator
was also debtor to the estate, it was held that the mere fact that his
account charged him with more money due the estate than was actually
the case did not constitute a waiver of the statute of limitations. The
account having been shown to have been made by mistake, the debt was
still barred.
'See cases notes 5 and 6, supra. But see Shepherd v. Thompson, 122
U. S. 231.
'Section 705, General Statutes of Connecticut (19o2). This statute
was originally enacted in i85o and applied only to written memoranda
but was extended in I88i (P.A. 1881, ch. 99) to include also declarations
of a deceased, and at that time the provision required a written acknowl-
edgment or promise to waive the statute of limitation (now Section 707,
Revision of 19o2) added to it. Of this statute it has been said that
its aim was to take away the great advantage which under preExisting
law living persons had over the representatives of the deceased. "This
advantage was one which found its expression in unwarranted inroads
upon estates of deceased persons in favor of the living whose mouths
were not closed. The object of the statute was to prevent these inroads."
MvIcahy v. Mulcahy, 84 Conn. 659, 662; Bissell v. Beckwith, 32 Conn.
509, 516; Rowland v. Ry. Co., 63 Conn. 415, 417.
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prohibition a creditor of a decedent could testify, without fear
of contradictory evidence, that the debtor had waived the bar.
The statute in question therefore prevents not only the estab-
lishment of stale demands against an estate but also the wasting
of the estate by fraudulent means. It would seem therefore to
require that the writing should be the exclusive memorial of the
acknowledgment.10
It has been held that under this statute any unequivocal
acknowledgment, though not necessarily in express words, is
sufficient."' Thus where the deceased's letters by reference
incorporated letters of plaintiff demanding the debt, it was held
that the debt was renewed.22  A letter of the deceased signed by
his direction by rubber stamp may also be sufficient.13 In these
cases the entire acknowledgment could be gathered from the
matter put into the writings. Where such written acknowledg-
ment does not exist the action is not barred.1 4
It would seem therefore that in this case there was no
acknowledgment of the debt contained in some writing made or
104 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2425. See also 2 Wigmore on Evidence,
§ 1466, note 4, that there are statutes generally in vogue, forbidding the
removal of the limitation except by an "express acknowledgment or new
promise in writing by the debtor." So under the Massachusetts statute
(Rev. Laws Mass. c. 2o2, § 12) oral evidence is not admissible. Custy
v. Donlan, 159 Mass. 245, citing Sumner v. Sumner, I Met. 394, 396, and
Chace v. Trafford, 1I6 Mass. 529. See also Smith v. Eastman, 3 Cush.
355. Under the Illinois statute it was held that an oral promise to pay
a note amounted to a redelivery of the note and hence recovery was
not barred. Sennett v. Horner, 30 Ill. 429.
' Sears v. Howe, 8o Conn. 414.
'Sears v. Howe, supra. By reference the letters exactly identified the
debt, thus: "Your letter came duly to hand . . . . I am sorry that I
am not in a position to help you out as you request. . . . just as
soon as I can see my way clear I will help you out."
"Deep River National Bank's Appeal, 73 Conn. 341. Here, too, the
references were explicit. They state that the deceased intended to pay
the notes of the H Company, on which he was an indorser.
4In Ensign v. Batterson, 68 Conn." 298, S gave C a note secured by
mortgage for $2600. Later S wrote asking C to sign a quitclaim of other
property, stating that "this is not the claim on which you hold a $26o0
mortgage. At the death of S recovery on the note was barred unless a
new promise could be shown. The court held that the letter was not
sufficient evidence of such a promise, and "oral acknowledgments by a
debtor cannot, under our statutes, support an action against his estate",
citing the statute. See Watertown Eccl. Society's Appeal, 46 Conn. 230,
decided before the passage of the statute.
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signed by the deceased, and that if there was a written promise
to pay the debt there was at most only a promise to pay $3,ooo.
It may perhaps be urged that the acknowledgment in writing
exists, though it must be helped out by other evidence; that the
dry bones are there though life and animation and vitality come
from without. Yet it is difficult to see how the acknowledgment
can be contained in some writing if, considering the writing
alone, there is no acknowledgment. It is like the painting of a
person wherein the face is blotted out and can be brought to
the mind's eye only by use of the extrinsic factors supplied by
the imagination. We hardly term such a painting a complete
portrait. The statute affords little protection against stale claims
if the vital part of the acknowledgment rests only in the oral
testimony of the claimant.
The justice of the result reached in the case probably would
be little questioned. Here the wife had made extensive loans to
the husband and the husband wished to secure her for such loans.
If the wife's recovery could be worked out upon some theory
agreeable with legal principles,15 quite possibly the equities of the
case would justify the preference of the wife over other credi-
tors. Whether such recovery should be permitted at the expense
of weakening the protective effects of a special statutory pro-
vision may perhaps be doubted.
MOSES V. MACFERLAN-IS IT SOUND LAW?
In a case' which has but lately come before the House of
Lords, the case of Moses v. Macferlan2 is criticised, Lord Sum-
ner saying that it has been dissented from, and the views there
expressed have been protested against. This case has been a
fertile source of argument. It has been declared unsound by
some courts, while numerous others have quoted from the opinion
of Lord Mansfield with approbation. What was actually decided
is lost sight of in considering the general principles there laid
In Devine v. Murphy, 168 Mass. 249, a mortgagee delivered up his
mortgage upon the debtor's oral promise to pay the barred debt. It was
held that no question concerning the statute of limitations arose, since
the oral promise was part of a present contract upon valuable considera-
tion. No rights of other creditors were involved.
'Sinclair v. Broughan, iii L. T. R. i.
22 Burr, Ioo5, i BI. 219.
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down. It might be well for us to find out exactly what was
there decided and whether it is in fact sound law.
The case was as follows: Moses had four promissory notes of
one Jacobs. These he indorsed to Macferlan to enable Macferlan
to sue Jacobs thereon, Macferlan expressly agreeing to indemnify
him against all consequences of such indorsement and agreeing
not to sue him. Notvithstanding, Macferlan did sue Moses in
the "Court of Conscience" and recovered £6 of him, that court
holding that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the defense-namely, the agreement not to sue. The present
action was then brought by Moses to recover the 6 in the Court
of King's Bench. The Court held that an action lay upon the
special agreement, and that since this was so the plaintiff could
sue in the common count for money had and received, waiving
his right to sue on the special contract.
The first point of disagreement is, that as the money was
awarded to Macferlan by a final unreversed judgment, his right
to it was res adjudicata and could not be subsequently readjudi-
cated in this second action. The reason for the doctrine of res
adjudicata is that litigation must have a termination. So the
judgments of courts having jurisdiction are held conclusive upon
the parties and their privies. They are conclusive because an
opportunity has been afforded to the parties thus concluded to
assert or defend their rights before the court rendering judg-
ment.3  Manifestly, such judgment does not operate as an estop-
pel with respect to matters not determined therein which could
not have been properly litigated under the issues in the action in
which the judgment was rendered. 4 Moses had no opportunity
to litigate the agreement with Macferlan, and so his rights under
such agreement clearly could not have become res adjudicata.
This is conclusive of his right to sue on the special agreement.
In our present day courts no doubt this agreement would be
admissible as a good defense. If so, should the judgment be
conclusive as to that cause of action if Moses should choose not
to rely on it as a defense? Some of our courts would hold that
the adjudication is final and conclusive, not only as to the mat-
ter actually determined, but as to every other matter which the
parties might have litigated as an incident thereto and coming
' Oxford v. Graham, 57 Mich. 422.
Storage Co. v. Reservoir Co., 25 Colo. 87; Mershon v. Williams, 63
N. J. L. 398; McKinney v. Curtis, 6o Mich. 620.
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within the legitimate purview of the subject matter of the suit.5
Other courts would make a distinction between a matter purely
defensive' and one which may be used for an affirmative cause
of action. They would say that if the matter is one of defense,
and nothing more, the defendant must present it, and if he fail
to do so, a judgment would render it res adjudicata and no action
could be brought on it. But if the matter present an affirmative
cause of action against the plaintiff, as well as a good defense,
the choice is the defendant's to interpose it as a defense or to
reserve it and to maintain an independent action on it for all
damages which he has sustained."
So, where the defendant had agreed on a sufficient con-
sideration to discontinue a suit against the plaintiff, and in
breach thereof had prosecuted the suit and recovered the judg-
ment, the court allowed the plaintiff suing on the agreement, to
recover the amount of the judgment.7 It was held that the action
was on the contract and if the contract was proved and the
breach of it, the recovery was for the breach of the contract, and
not to recover back money paid on the judgment.
Tn Hunt v. Brown,8 the defendant promised on a sufficient
consideration to accept a certain settlement in full discharge of
a note against the plaintiff. In breach thereof he sued on the
note and recovered. The plaintiff thereupon brought suit for
breach of the agreement. The court held that he was not bound
to use the agreement as a defense in the former action. "A
breach of it was a substantive cause of action, upon which the
present plaintiff could bring his own suit in his own way. When
a defendant has the choice of setting up a matter in defense, or
of suing upon it in another action, if he chooses not to set it up
in defense, of course the judgment in the action against him is
no bar to a subsequent suit by him."
From these authorities it is evident that Moses could have
sued on a special agreement. Could he waive this right, and
sue on the common counts for money had and received? This is
most vigorously denied in a leading English case,6 which holds
that Moses' only remedy lay in an action on the agreement.
'Bodkin v,. Rollyson, 48 W. Va. 453.
'Brown v. First Nati. Bank, 132 Fed. 450.
" Cobb v. Curtis, 8 Johns. 367; Smith v. Palner, 6 Cush. 513.
a 146 Mass. 253. See also, Snow v. Prescott, 12 N. H. 535.
'Phillips v. Hunter, 2 H. BI. 416.
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It is important to see that the contract between Moses and
Macferlan was not one of reimbursement. There was no idea
that Moses should or might be forced to pay the notes, and that
Macferlan should later restore such amount to him. It was
expressly agreed that he should not be sued upon the notes-
that he should be exonerated-and the present suit is not to
enforce a primary obligation imposed upon Macferlan by the
terms of the contract, but to enforce a secondary remedial obli-
gation imposed through a breach of the primary obligation.
It is a general rule of law that where there is an express con-
tract, the law will not imply one. As there is a remedy on the
express contract, the law does not need to give another remedy on
an implied contract. Yet this general rule is open to exception,
and under certain circumstances, even though there be an express
promise the law will imply another, and an action will lie on
either.10
Numerous cases11 hold that where a plaintiff has done every-
thing which the agreement required on his part, and nothing
remains to be done but the performance of a duty on the defend-
ant's part to pay money due the plaintiff under the contract, the
plaintiff may recover on the common counts in assumpsit, and
need not declare specially. The duty to pay the money is a pri-
mary duty, which the defendant has expressly assumed, and not
a secondary remedial obligation imposed as damages for the
breach of a primary duty. As previously pointed out, Macferlan
did not assume a primary duty to pay the money in question.
This duty arose only as a secondary remedial obligation.
Again, money paid on an executory contract which the recipi-
ent of the payment fails to fulfil may be recovered back on the
common counts. 12 The plaintiff is allowed to treat the contract
as rescinded, and to demand restitution of that which is given to
the defendant in expectation of the performance thereof. The
measure of damage is not what the plaintiff has suffered, but
what he gave to the defendant in expectation of the performance
of the contract by the defendant. Does the principal case fall
within this class? Apparently not. Moses is not suing for res-
titution of that which was obtained from him in expectation of
"Princeton & Kingston Turnpike Co. v. Gulick, i6 N. J. L. 16i.
'Jackson v. Hough, 38 W. Va. 236; Rolling et al. v. Duffy, 14 Brad.
69; Harper v. Claxton, 62 Ala. 46; Felton v. Dickinson, io Mass. 287.
"King v. Hutchins, 28 N. H. 56r; Wheeler v. Board, i2 Johns. 363.
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the performance of the contract. He sues for that which was
obtained by a breach of the contract. To say that he can treat
the contract as rescinded, and then prove his right to the money
in question by showing that it was obtained through a breach of
that contract, violates the principle that when a contract is
rescinded no action can be maintained in reliance thereon. To be
sure the basic reason for Moses' right to his money is the same
as that which leads to the restitution of money advanced on a
contract subsequently rescinded-the fact that the defendant was
under a duty to turn it over to the plaintiff. Yet the different
state of facts giving rise to this duty would, we believe, leave the
courts to hold that such a case would not fall within this class.
Even though the courts might not consider the principal case
to fall within the last named class, it is submitted that it bears
an even more striking similarity to those cases in which money
wrongfully obtained by a defendant is recoverable on the com-
mon counts. To be sure, the wrong in such cases is a tort, and
the action is allowed under the familiar principle of the waiver
of tort in suit in assumpsit for the amount of the unjust enrich-
ment of the defendant's estate. But in the principal case the
enrichment is acquired by a positive wrongful act on the part of
the defendant, not a tortious act, but yet a breach of his legal
duty. There seems to be no valid reason why, in a like manner,
the plaintiff should not be allowed to waive the right to damages
for the wrongful act of the defendant, namely, the breach of
the special contract, and sue for the amount of the unjust enrich-
ment of the defendant's estate.
Underlying all these classes of quasi-contractual action is this
one basic fact, that the defendant has that of the plaintiff's which
he should not keep, and which he should return. Originated
to supply the deficiency of the then existing forms of action,
which were unable in all cases to do justice, it has, because of
its more equitable nature, usurped to a certain extent the place
of the former. The oft quoted argument of Lord Mansfield
well merits its use wherever there is a liquidated debt due from
the defendant to the plaintiff, even though there may not be a
precedent directly in point to rely upon.
Whether our law courts, unsupported by other precedents
exactly similar to the principal case would follow the dictum of
Lord Ellenborough in Phillips v. Hunter'3 and say that the only
132 H. BI. 416.
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remedy lay upon the special agreement, remains an open ques-
tion. But their increasing recognition of equitable principles,
and the willingness with which they have freed themselves from
the fetters of an over-technical system of pleading, would lead us
to asseverate that, just as Moses v. Macferlan was, so it is, and
will be considered sound law.
THE POWER OF A COUNTY TO TAX ITSELF FOR A STATE
INSTITUTION TO BE LOCATED IN THAT COUNTY.
It is a fundamental principle, implied in all definitions of tax-
ation, that taxes can be levied for public purposes only., It is
equally fundamental that the purpose of the tax shall be one
which in an especial and peculiar manner pertains to the district
upon which it is to be levied.2 Where the purpose for which the
tax is to be levied concerns the whole state, then the whole state
should bear the burden of the tax; where the purpose concerns
only some particular district of the state, then that district only
should bear the tax.2 These principles are universally accepted,
because, as stated by Judge Cooley,4 they are "as sound in
morals as they are in law."
Counties, cities, towns, taxing districts, are all created by and
under the control of the state.5 This control, however, cannot
be carried to such an extent as to transcend any of the funda-
mental principles just stated.6 It therefore becomes important
when levying a tax to determine whether the object reaches the
whole state, or only some particular taxing district.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas in a recent case,7 McCullough,
C. J., and Wood, J., dissenting, held that a county could not
'Matter of Mayor, etc., of N. Y., ii Johns. (N. Y.) 77, 80; Van Horn
v. People, 46 Mich. 183, 185.
2Hantmet v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146, 15,; Steiner v. Sullival, 74
Minn. 498.
'Steiner v. Sullivan, supra; Hutchinson v. Ozard Land Co., 57 Ark.
554. This principle is very clearly stated and explained in "Cooley on
Taxation," 3d ed., vol. I, p. 225, et seq.
" Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 227.
'Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534; Bulkeley v. Williams, 68 Conn.
131.
'Lowell v. Boston, iii Mass. 454; Matter of Jensen, 44 N. Y. App.
Div. 509.
7State Agricultural School District No. z v. Craighead County, 169
S. NV. (Ark.) 964.
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vote any part of its funds for the benefit of a state agricultural
school, as a bonus to induce its location in that county." The
court based its decision upon the ground that the school was a
state institution, and the citizens of the county in which it was
located would acquire no greater rights to the use of the facilities
of the school than those enjoyed by other counties. The fact
that the school would be more accessible to the people of the
county in which it was situated was held not to deprive the
school of its character as a state institution.
A contrary decision has been reached in the other states where
this question has been in issue, upholding the validity of an obli-
gation entered into by a county for the purpose of securing
within its limits a state institution." These cases seem to lay
down the sounder rule. The establishment of a public institu-
tion of general utility, such as an educational institution, in a
particular locality is of a real benefit to the citizens of that
locality in enabling them to make use of it with greater ease
and at a less cost than others, who may have an equal right to
make use of its facilities but who are more remotely situated.
Moreover, real estate values would naturally increase, while the
advantages to tradesmen are obvious. It is more in accord with
principles of equality to permit those who receive the greater
benefit to assume the greater burden, than to argue that because
an institution belongs to the whole state, the whole state must be
taxed equally without regard to locality.
8 Art. 7, sec. 28, of the Constitution of Arkansas, provides that the
county court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of the disbursements of
moneys for county purposes, and in every other case that may be held
necessary for the internal improvement and local concerns of the respective
counties.
'Merrick v. Inhabitants of Amherst, 12 Allen 50o; Burr et al. v.
Carbondale, 76 Ill. 455; Hensley v. People, 84 Ill. 544; Marks v. Trustees,
37 Ind. 155; Briggs v. Johnson Co., 4 Dillon 148; Co. of Livingston v.
Darlington, 1oi U. S. 4o7. In State of Wis. ex rel., etc., v. Haben, 22
Wis. 66o, the following language is used: "The advantages incidentally
accruing to the citizens of Oshkosh from the establishment of a state
normal school at that place, though sufficient, with the consent of the
legislature, to justify the citizens themselves . . . . in levying a tax
to aid in the purchase of site or the erection of buildings. . . . The
tax so levied must be with the consent of the citizens or proper city
officers. The legislature has no power arbitrarily to impose such a
tax. . . . This distinction does not seem to be well drawn. The ques-
tion is wholly one of local concern. If the object is of that nature, then
the legislature through its supreme power is able to impose such a tax.
Gordon v. Comes et al., 47 N. Y. 6o8.
